Starknet's underlying ZK-STARK technology relies on hash-based cryptography and programmable accounts that allow adopting new signature schemes without a protocol upgrade.

Overview Debates Related claims Topics Sources

Google researchers estimated that a sufficiently powerful future quantum computer could theoretically derive a Bitcoin private key from an exposed public key in approximately 9 minutes.

Google Cloud stated its Multi-Party Compute architecture is designed to accommodate future post-quantum cryptography upgrades without requiring financial institutions to rebuild their operational systems.

Starknet aims to achieve full post-quantum security by 2027, two years ahead of Ethereum's projected 2029 target for quantum resistance.

Starknet relies on Ethereum for bridge messaging and blob data availability using KZG commitments and elliptic-curve cryptography, which StarkWare identified as post-quantum vulnerabilities that cannot upgrade independently while remaining a Layer 2.

CERT/CC published advisory VU#701544 on October 26, 2026, identifying a hardened-derivation vulnerability in Fireblocks' mpc-lib library under CVE-2026-90975.

CERT/CC recommended keeping chain codes confidential and avoiding reliance on hardened key derivation to isolate signer shares until Fireblocks corrects its mpc-lib library implementation.

The SP1 soundness flaw affected native Rust verification in sp1_hypercube, sp1_prover, and sp1_sdk versions 6.0.0 through 6.8.0

A high-severity soundness bug in Succinct's SP1 zero-knowledge proving system exposed Succinct's mainnet Prover Network to invalid execution proofs from third-party provers

On-chain Solidity verifiers for Groth16 and Plonk checks and applications whose proof aggregation ended in Groth16 or Plonk proofs were unaffected by SP1's high-severity soundness bug

Succinct deployed the version 6.8.1 patch for SP1's soundness bug to the mainnet Prover Network, requiring no configuration changes from users requesting network proofs

An attacker could exploit SP1 by supplying proof data with mismatched size labels, causing the native Rust verifier to accept an invalid proof

Succinct stated in GitHub security advisory GHSA-p7v2-jjv3-8p8f that its mainnet Prover Network was the only known deployment affected by a high-severity soundness bug in SP1's proving system

Succinct advised users running native Rust verifiers in SP1 who accept proofs from untrusted provers to upgrade their software to version 6.8.1

Groth16 and Plonk proof checks in SP1 remained safe because they used wrapped proofs with fixed shapes that bypassed prover-controlled tensor formats

SP1 stores multidimensional data in Tensors, where SP1's native Rust verifier failed to check whether the number of stored elements matched the product of the tensor's declared dimensions

Succinct released version 6.8.1, which patched a high-severity soundness bug in SP1, on September 24, 2026, 17 days before publishing GitHub security advisory GHSA-p7v2-jjv3-8p8f on October 11, 2026

Under Alpenglow's Votor mechanism on Solana, validators send BLS-signed vote messages directly off-chain rather than submitting votes as block transactions

Anza is researching a post-quantum upgrade named Quantumglow to introduce hash-based signatures while preserving 150-millisecond finality

ECDSA authenticates blockchain account ownership by generating digital signatures on transactions across a distributed ledger

ECDSA stands for Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm