Cc9f267dcClaimNews eventAave guardians restored V3 and V4 market operations in four wavesAgreeDisagree
Cc9f267dcClaimNews eventA wallet associated with the hacker behind the $6.3 billion Binance exploit deposited 60 million USDT into Aave V3 Ethereum Core to borrow 19,762 WETHAgreeDisagree
Cc9f267dcClaimLlamaRisk reported on October 30, 2026, that the Aave position of the hacker behind the $6.3 billion Binance exploit remained overcollateralized with $59.9 million in assets against $43.8 million in debtAgreeDisagree
Cc9f267dcClaimDuring Aave's freeze triggered by the Binance hack starting October 29, 2026, blocked deposits and ongoing supplier withdrawals drove utilization in major stablecoin pools to 92–100%AgreeDisagree
Cc9f267dcClaimAave set a zero loan-to-value ratio on V3 and zero collateral factor on V4 for nine assets including USDT, USDC, USDT0, POL, WAVAX, sAVAX, XAUt, PAXG, and OP, following the Binance hackAgreeDisagree
Cc9f267dcClaimAave's zero collateral restrictions imposed after the $6.3 billion Binance hack prevent restricted assets from backing new loans while allowing existing V3 positions to retain their health scores and liquidation thresholdsAgreeDisagree
Cc9f267dcClaimLlamaRisk reduced Slope2 borrowing-rate parameters on Aave to flatten the upper interest-rate curve and protect borrowers from escalating rates during deposits blocked by the Binance hackAgreeDisagree
Cc9f267dcClaimLlamaRisk executed lower borrowing ceilings on Aave V3 and V4, eliminating approximately $3.7 billion of unused borrowing capacity on V3 and $130 million on V4AgreeDisagree
Cc9f267dcClaimQueued GHO borrow-cap reductions on Aave cut Core market ceilings from 150 million to 105 million GHO and Prime market ceilings from 85 million to 35 million GHOAgreeDisagree
Cc9f267dcClaimCore USDC borrowing fell below levels before the Binance hack exploit by October 30, 2026, leaving its listed cap approximately 248.4 million USDC above current debtAgreeDisagree
Cc9f267dcClaimLlamaRisk's modeled full-utilization borrowing interest rate ceilings listed 20% for Core DAI, 34% for Core USDtb, 25% for Monad mUSD, and 19% for Ethereum Core frxUSDAgreeDisagree
Cc9f267dcClaimLlamaRisk reported that only the Aave V4 collateral-configuration wave of Aave's four-wave rollback plan was explicitly marked as executed by 13:49 UTC on October 30, 2026AgreeDisagree
Cc9f267dcClaimIn Loopscale's lending market for Apollo's private credit fund token ECRED, an absence of secondary market liquidity capped total deposits between 10 million and 12 million dollarsAgreeDisagree
Cc9f267dcClaimFormation is a merged company formed by the Solana decentralized exchange Orca and the fixed-rate credit platform LoopscaleAgreeDisagree
Cc9f267dcClaimDawn is a telecom infrastructure financing company that originates loans offchain using a Loopscale-powered vaultAgreeDisagree
Cc9f267dcClaimOn Loopscale, USDC lending interest rates against collateralized ONYC tokens yielded 1% to 2% above standard market USDC deposit ratesAgreeDisagree
Cc9f267dcClaimOrca passed a governance proposal prior to the Formation merger that dissolved the Orca governance councilAgreeDisagree
Cc9f267dcClaimTrading protocol fee revenues fluctuate cyclically with market volatility, whereas decentralized lending yields provide more stable recurring revenueAgreeDisagree
Cc9f267dcClaimFollowing Orca's governance proposal ahead of its merger with Loopscale, Orca token holder voting rights were restricted primarily to token minting and changes in corporate controlAgreeDisagree
Cc9f267dcClaimThe merger between Orca and Loopscale vertically integrates secondary market trading liquidity with an onchain credit and vault platformAgreeDisagree