Philosopher Paul Thagard published a 2022 paper arguing that physical energy requirements undermine functionalist substrate independence

Overview Debates Related claims Topics

In philosophy of mind, a philosophical zombie is a hypothetical entity that exhibits intelligent behavior without experiencing phenomenal consciousness

Joscha Bach and Hikari Sorensen co-authored a paper modeling the mind as generating two distinct domains: external world representations and abstract ideas

Anil Seth advocates biological naturalism, positing that consciousness requires the specific physical and causal substrate of biological living organisms

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's mill thought experiment asserts that mechanical interactions of physical parts cannot explain perception

Aristotle's treatise De Anima defines the soul as a mortal causal pattern bound to the physical body

Aristotle categorized living souls into three hierarchical divisions: vegetative souls in plants, sensate souls in animals, and rational souls in humans

Animism defines living systems as possessed by intrinsic, agentic causal patterns capable of experience

Physicalism is the philosophical hypothesis that physical reality comprises a causally closed mechanical layer that does not respond to human intentions

Functionalism defines an entity by its causal relations, operational mappings, and environmental interactions rather than by an internal essence

Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico formulated a cyclical theory of human historical progression and civilizational development

Descartes proposed intuitive dualism, the idea that the mind is fundamentally separate from the physical body

Philosophers distinguish between what is genuinely possible and what is merely conceivable

Solipsism is a philosophical stance that only one's own mind is sure to exist

Unlike the Boltzmann brain problem, the philosophical stance of solipsism does not come with attached equations

Human consciousness and experience are substrate-independent and could be implemented on silicon hardware

Philosopher Charles Taylor distinguishes between a "porous self," which is open to reality, and a "buffeted self," which is sealed off

Charles Taylor describes the modern self as a "buffeted self" that treats life as a project to be controlled and optimized

The 'hard problem of consciousness' is not an unsolvable metaphysical problem

There is no metaphysical separation between consciousness and the physical, or between mind and body

Consciousness, soul, spirit, and body are different languages for talking about the same phenomena